Guilt and Antisocial Conformism: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh by Shoji, Masahiro
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Guilt and Antisocial Conformism:
Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh
Shoji, Masahiro
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo
28 May 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/100735/
MPRA Paper No. 100735, posted 28 May 2020 17:10 UTC
 1   
Guilt and Antisocial Conformism: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh * 
Masahiro Shoji ** 
Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo 
 
Abstract 
This study conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Bangladesh to disentangle 
motives for conformity in antisocial behavior. In a take-away game, the previous 
participants’ choice is revealed before a decision is made. Conformism is measured by 
the correlation between the information and own choice. This design allows conformism 
via learning about social norms, changing social preference, and changing the belief 
about the opponent’s expected amount of take-away. To disentangle the effect of belief, 
the participants in the treatment group are also informed about the opponent’s expected 
amount to be taken away. The results show conformism only in the control group, 
suggesting the channel through the belief. These results are consistent with the broken 
windows theory and also support the relevance of belief-dependent social preference in 
decision making. 
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1. Introduction 
Conformism is a basic aspect of human behavior. In particular, mounting evidence 
suggests conformism in antisocial behavior, such as theft, violence, substance use, 
underage drinking, smoking, and cheating in class (Bayer et al., 2009; Gaviria and 
Raphael, 2001; Glaeser et al., 1996; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Lundborg, 2006; Patacchini 
and Zenou, 2008, 2012; Zenou, 2003). Since it causes an astoundingly high disparity of 
socio-economic consequences across regions with seemingly comparable characteristics, 
it is essential for policymakers to have effective policies to mitigate antisocial 
conformism. 
Although researchers have long studied this issue, the existing literature leaves 
two issues unaddressed. First, there is no consensus on whether conformism indeed exists, 
given that some empirical studies provide counterevidence (Dahl and DellaVigna, 2009; 
Ludwig and Kling, 2007). This mixed empirical evidence is partly derived from the 
difficulties in identifying conformism using observational data (Manski, 1993, 2000), 
which highlights the importance of additional studies using experimental approaches, 
such as those employed by Falk and Fischbacher (2002) and Keizer et al. (2008). Second, 
various mechanisms exist for the occurrence of conformism, such as strategic 
complementarity, extrinsic incentive, change in preference, and change in belief (see 
section 3 for details). However, which of these particularly explain the behavioral pattern 
is largely unexplored. 
The present study bridges these gaps in the literature by experimentally examining 
whether and why people conform in antisocial behavior. Specifically, a take-away game 
is conducted in which a participant takes away their opponent’s endowment. This study 
assumes that it is antisocial to take away a large amount to violate the 50–50 norm 
(Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). This game is frequently used in the literature to 
manipulate antisocial behavior (Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee, 1998; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2002; Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair, 2010), but a distinction of the 
experiment herein is that the participants are informed about previous participants’ 
behavior before making their decision. This study elicits the extent of conformism 
through the correlation between their behavior and that of previous participants. 
This experimental design allows conformism to occur via three channels. First, 
the participants learn about social norms by knowing the others’ behavior. Second, it 
changes individual social preferences. Third, it changes own belief about how much the 
opponent expects to be taken away by the participant. Belief-dependent social preferences, 
such as guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), predict that this affects the 
utility loss of taking away a large amount. To disentangle the third channel from the others, 
the participants in the treatment group are additionally informed about the opponent’s 
expected amount to be taken away, so that the conformism in this group is not driven by 
the third channel. 
The results show conformism for the control group but not for the treatment group, 
supporting the channel through the change in belief but not through the other channels. 
This means that the participants take away more as the other participants take away a 
larger amount, because they believe that their opponent should also expect a larger 
amount of take-away in such a situation. Therefore, they do not experience a utility loss 
even by taking away a large amount. These results also support the relevance of belief-
dependent social preferences. 
This study is closely related to studies such as Falk and Fischbacher (2002), Fatas 
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et al. (2018), Shang and Croson (2009), and Zafar (2011), who experimentally examine 
conformity in prosocial/antisocial behavior. A distinction of the current study is that it 
disentangles the underlying motives. Gächter et al. (2013) also disentangle two 
mechanisms of peer effects, social preference and social norms, but they do not argue the 
effect through the change in belief. This is important for two reasons. First, existing 
studies have argued whether heterogeneity in the behavior of individuals is caused by 
heterogeneity in beliefs or preferences (Ellingsen et al., 2012; Fehr and Hoff, 2011; 
Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Vanberg, 2008). This study contributes to this aspect of 
the literature. Second, the broken windows theory proposed by Kelling and Wilson (1982) 
and Wilson and Kelling (2003) is frequently discussed among sociologists and 
criminologists to explain the conformism in crimes. This theory argues the conformity 
through the change in belief, but previous evidence for this theory, such as Keizer et al. 
(2008), does not rigorously test the role of beliefs.1 Therefore, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study to test the validity of this aspect of the theory. 
Finally, it is particularly insightful to study the antisocial behavior in developing 
countries such as Bangladesh, since such countries have long grappled with problems 
arising from ineffective law enforcement. Therefore, social norms and social preferences 
are expected to play significant roles in mitigating antisocial behavior in such areas. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
experimental design. Section 3 formalizes the testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the 
results, and concluding remarks are presented in section 5. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
2.1. Procedure and Participants 
The study site is the Satkhira district in southwestern Bangladesh. A household survey 
was conducted with 285 randomly selected households in 16 rural villages (18 households 
per village) in December 2010.2 After completion of the survey, the survey enumerators 
invited the households to participate in the experiment to be conducted eight months later 
and informed them about the reward payment for their cooperation in the survey. 
In August 2011, the experiment was conducted at the local government offices. 
A total of 36 surveyed households from two villages were invited per day, and the 
experiment was conducted over eight days. A total of 279 out of the 285 surveyed 
households participated in the experiment.3 On each experiment day, half the participants 
 
1 It argues that if a neighborhood ignores the incidence of petty crime, such as broken 
windows, potential criminals would anticipate that the neighborhood does not care 
about crimes, which in turn would lead to crimes that are more serious. 
2 Specifically, the survey was conducted in the Kaliganj and Ashashoni subdistricts. In 
the sampling of surveyed households, two unions were first randomly sampled from 
each sub-district. “Union” is an administrative unit in Bangladesh. Each union includes 
multiple villages. In the next stage, four villages from each union and one cluster from 
each of the villages were randomly selected. Finally, 18 households from each cluster 
were chosen. Of the total households sampled, 285 participated in the household survey. 
3 In order to assure the sample size, I did not randomly select the experiment participants 
within households. In cases in which the household head was not available, the next senior 
person representing the household (usually the spouse or son) was recruited to maintain 
the sample size. 
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(nine from each village) were randomly chosen and allocated to room C. The remaining 
participants were allocated to room T. The participants in room C were further divided 
into participants for even- and odd-numbered experiment days. Thus, the participants 
were randomly divided into three groups: the treatment group (N=137) in room T, the 
control group (N=71) in room C, and the remaining (N=71) in room C. However, this 
study does not use the data from the third group because they participated in different 
games. Therefore, the final sample size is 208. 
Participants played six games, as summarized in Table A1: two sessions of take-
away games, dictator game, trust game with hidden action, risk preference game, and trust 
game with complete information. However, this study uses only the results of the take-
away games.4 After finishing all the games, each participant received their payoff from 
only one randomly selected decision. Therefore, they did not know the decision from 
which they received the payoff and were aware that each participant had earned money 
from a different decision. This is important for two reasons. First, it alleviates the 
correlation of choices within participants across games due to the wealth effect. Second, 
if participants were to earn money from all games and discuss the payoffs after the 
experiment, they may have been able to infer the choices of the other participants. This 
would have violated participant anonymity, potentially affecting behavior. 
Online Appendix A presents a further description about the experiment 
implementation, such as the issues of information spillover and participants’ 
comprehension, is presented in Online Appendix A. 
 
2.2. Take-away Game 
This study uses a take-away game (gangster game) to replicate antisocial behavior in an 
experimental setting. This game is played anonymously by a pair of participants matched 
randomly: Player A and Player B. At the beginning of the game, experimenters give 400 
Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) to Player A. While Player B receives nothing initially, he/she 
can take away 0, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, or 400 BDT from Player A. Player A 
cannot control the endowment from Player B. Therefore, if Player B decides to take away 
x amount, the material payoff of Player A is 400–x and that of Player B is x. The maximum 
amount of payoff from this game is 400 BDT which is equivalent to about four days’ 
worth of income in the study area. Online Appendix B presents the script of the 
experiment. 
 
Session 1 
This study conducted two sessions of the take-away game. The first session applied the 
strategy method regarding the role of the participants, so that all participants made 
decisions as both Player A and B.5 They were asked the following two questions: 
 
4 Using the results of trust game with complete information, the risk preference game, 
and the household survey, Shoji (2018) demonstrates that the incentive for risk sharing 
between villagers, characterized by the negative correlation of incomes, is positively 
associated with their experimentally elicited trust. Shoji (2020) uses the results of the 
trust game with hidden action to elicit villagers’ guilt sensitivity. He shows that those 
with higher sensitivity are more likely to repay loans and have better access to credit. 
5 Although the strategy method has some potential concerns, Brandts and Charness 
(2011) claim (based on a large number of previous studies) that the results of the strategy 
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(T1-1) Suppose you are Player B. How much money will you take away from Player A? 
(T1-2) Suppose you are Player A. How much money do you think Player B will take away 
from you? 
 
The first question elicits the antisocial behavior, x, while the second question captures 
Player A’s belief about the choice of Player B, denoted by τA.6 
 
Session 2 
The pairs were also randomly matched in the second session. In this session, each 
participant was asked about the choice as Player B only, and the experimental design was 
changed slightly. For the control group in room C, the experimenters informed each 
participant about the amount the participants in the previous days took away from their 
paired Player A, denoted by xP, as follows: 
 
(T2-1) You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took away 
about _________ BDT, and Player A paired with you also knows this. How much money 
will you then take away? 
 
Regarding the informed amount, since most participants chose to take away 100, 200, or 
300 BDT, one value was randomly chosen with equal probability for each participant.7 
Therefore, each participant within the experiment room received different information. 
Player B decides x conditional on the information xP. 
On the other hand, for the treatment group in room T, the experimenters informed 
each participant about xp and the paired Player A’s belief about x, as follows: 
 
(T2-2) You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took away 
about _________ BDT, and Player A paired with you also knows this. Additionally, Player 
A anticipates that you will take away _________ BDT. How much money will you then 
take away? 
 
Regarding the information about Player A’s belief, I use the amount elicited in (T1-2) 
from the paired participant τA.  
 
2.3. Measures 
Antisocial Behavior 
In previous studies, amount x is considered to be a proxy for antisocial behavior 
(Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 2002; Schildberg-
 
and direct-response methods are comparable. 
6 Belief-elicitation experiments usually reward accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to 
payments for other decisions, but this study does not, given that recent studies suggest 
that this approach potentially affects participants’ incentive in a different way (Blanco et 
al., 2010; Gächter and Renner, 2010). 
7 On the previous day to start the experiment, the same experiments were conducted 
with non-randomly recruited participants. I used this result for the peer information to 
the participants on the first experiment day. 
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Hörisch and Strassmair, 2010). However, since taking money is in fact allowed in the 
experiment, the decision rule to take money in this game may be different from the one 
to commit antisocial behavior in the field. Furthermore, Player B may think of the 
endowment as an unexpected gift from the experimenters to Player A, and therefore, 
consider equal allocation, namely the 50–50 norm, as appropriate (Andreoni and 
Bernheim, 2009). This is likely because the households of both Player A and B 
participated in the household survey prior to the experiment. Therefore, they may believe 
that they deserve to keep some of the payoff as a reward for the survey. 
Given this argument, I use the binary indicator for violation of the 50–50 norm (x 
> 200) to approximate antisocial behavior. For robustness, I also use the amount taken 
over the 50–50 norm, that is, max{0, x-200}, as an alternative measure. 
 
Conformism 
In line with previous studies (Chen et al., 2010; Fatas et al., 2018; Sasaki, 2019; Zafar, 
2011), conformism is measured by the correlation between xp and x. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework and Testable Hypothesis 
3.1. Motives for Take-Away 
The amount of take-away is determined by various motives in addition to self-interest. 
The first is outcome-based social preferences, such as pure altruism and inequity aversion. 
The second determinant is social norms, defined as collectively recognized rules of 
conduct that prescribe socially acceptable behavior in a given situation (López-Pérez, 
2008). Participants take away a smaller amount when intrinsic motivation to follow the 
social norms, such as self-image, is stronger. Third, belief-dependent social preferences, 
such as guilt aversion, also cause people to be prosocial. 
The guilt aversion preference of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) considers that 
an individual experiences a utility loss if they believe their behavior falls short of 
someone’s expectation and lets the latter down. In the context of the take-away game, 
Player B feels guilty if they believe that they take away more than what Player A expects. 
This feeling of guilt is interpreted as guilt aversion. Suppose τA represents Player A’s 
expectation about x. Then, the excess amount Player B takes away is indicated by max{x–
τA, 0}. Since τA is unobservable for Player B, they do not know by exactly how much their 
choice lets Player A down. Hence, they make decisions based on their expectation about 
τA, which is denoted by τB. In other words, τA and τB are the first- and second-order beliefs 
about x, respectively. Therefore, max{x–τB, 0} indicates how much Player B believes they 
let Player A down by taking away as much as x. The utility function of Player B with the 
guilt averse preference can be described as follows: 
u= x–g max{x–τB, 0} (1) 
where g represents the unwillingness to fall short of Player A’s expectation (guilt 
sensitivity parameter). In this formula, the optimal level of x is 400 BDT if g is less than 
1 and τB otherwise. This leads to the prediction that x increases with an increase in τB and 
a decrease in g. 
Previous studies provide evidence on the relevance of guilt aversion from the 
laboratory and the field. In particular, Shoji (2020) uses the experimental data collected 
from the same sample as this study to show that their behavioral pattern in the field is 
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consistent with guilt aversion.8 
 
3.2. Drivers of Conformism and Testable Hypothesis 
The arguments in section 3.1 suggest that antisocial conformism occurs through three 
channels in this experiment. First, if the participants do not know the socially acceptable 
behavior, they may follow xP because they assume it is socially acceptable. Second, both 
outcome-based and belief-dependent social preferences may become weak as xP increases 
(Funk, 2005; Sliwka, 2007). In the context of guilt aversion preference, this channel 
indicates ∂g/∂xP <0. Third, belief-dependent social preference causes conformism 
through the change in belief; the disutility from taking away a large amount may decrease 
with xP because the participants believe that their opponents should also expect a large 
amount of take-away given xP, that is, ∂τB/∂xP >0. Therefore, the participants believe that 
taking away a substantial amount should not let the opponents down. 
In addition to these channels, strategic complementarity and extrinsic incentive 
to follow the social norms, such as disapproval by peers and a negative social image, may 
also cause antisocial conformism in the field behavior (Carpenter, 2004; Reyniers and 
Bhalla, 2013; Sah, 1991; Murphy et al., 1993; Rasmusen, 1996; Funk, 2005). However, 
these possibilities are ruled out in the current study’s experiment. By nature, extrinsic 
incentives arise only when the individual’s identity and actions are observable to others 
(Zafar, 2011). Therefore, this channel is ruled out because each participant is 
anonymously paired with a randomly selected opponent.9 In addition, xP does not affect 
the material payoff of Player A or B, ruling out strategic complementarity. 
Furthermore, the treatment in the experiment disentangles the channel through the 
change in belief from the remaining channels. Since the participants in the control group 
receive the information on xP only, the correlation between x and xP captures the impact 
through the three channels. On the other hand, the participants in the treatment group 
receive the information on τA as well as xP. This makes τA and τB coincide, and therefore, 
makes τB a random variable observable to researchers.10 Since τB is randomly determined 
regardless of xP, if a correlation is found in the treatment group it should be attributed to 
a channel different from the change in τB. Thus, the following testable hypotheses are 
established: 
 
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS: 
(a) If conformism does not occur through any channels related with learning about 
socially acceptable behavior, changing preference, or changing belief, x should be 
uncorrelated with xP in either group. 
 
8 For experimental evidence see Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Dufwenberg et al. 
(2011), Bellemare et al. (2011), Ellingsen et al. (2012), Battigalli et al. (2013), Beck et 
al. (2013), Khalmetski et al. (2015), Hauge (2016), and Khalmetski (2016). However, it 
should also be mentioned that some studies provide counterevidence (Ellingsen et al., 
2010; Kawagoe and Narita, 2014; Vanberg, 2008). 
9 This experimental design may not fully rule out the roles of extrinsic incentive, given 
the fact that the researchers and experimenters can observe the choices of the participants. 
However, this effect may be ignored, according to Barmettler et al. (2012). 
10 The strategy to inform the first-order belief was first suggested by Ellingsen et al. 
(2010). 
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(b) If conformism occurs through changes in belief, x should be positively correlated with 
xP only in the control group. 
(c) If conformism occurs through the change in preference or learning about socially 
acceptable behavior, x should be positively correlated with xP in both groups with the 
same magnitude. 
(d) If conformism occurs through both channels, then a positive correlation should be 
found in both groups, and the magnitude of correlation should be larger in the control 
group. 
 
To test the hypothesis, the following equation is estimated: 1[𝑥௜ > 200] = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑥௜௉஼ + 𝛼ଶ𝑥௜௉் + 𝛼ଷ𝑇௜ + 𝜀௜ (2)  
where xPC (xPT) denotes xP reported to the participants in the control (treatment) group. It 
takes zero for the participants in the treatment (control) group. Ti is the indicator of the 
treatment group. Standard errors are clustered at the experiment day and room level. Since 
there are only 12 clusters, the OLS model is estimated to compute the wild bootstrap p-
values of Cameron et al. (2008). In this specification, α1=α2=0 supports Hypothesis (a), 
α1>0 and α2=0 is consistent with (b), α1=α2>0 supports (c), and finally α1>α2>0 implies 
(d). 
These empirical tests are valid even when the disutility of guilt in Equation (1) 
is nonlinear, for example, uB= x–g max{x–τB, 0}ρ and ρ>1. Furthermore, we should 
additionally observe α3>0 in this case: obtaining the information on τA reduces the risk of 
letting them down. This increases the amount to take away on average. 
 
4. Results 
Table A2 presents the summary statistics of experimental results and participant 
characteristics. Before demonstrating the main result, a balance test is conducted. 
Specifically, the outcomes in the first session and participant characteristics are regressed 
on the independent variables of Equation (2). According to Table A3, none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant, confirming the validity of the experiment. 
Figure 1 depicts the mean amount of x relative to the groups and the level of xP. 
The average amount increases with xP only in the control group. Column (1) of Table 1 
presents the OLS results of Equation (2). In line with the pattern of Figure 1, it shows that, 
for the control group, an increase in xP by 100 BDT significantly increases the likelihood 
of taking away more than 200 BDT by 10 percentage points. By contrast, xP is not 
correlated with the behavior of the treatment group. The difference in the coefficients is 
statistically significant (p-value=0.084). These patterns lend support to part (b) of the 
hypothesis, that is, conformism driven by the changes in the belief. Finally, the coefficient 
of treatment group dummy is significantly positive. This could occur for two reasons. 
First, the disutility of guilt increases nonlinearly, as discussed in section 3. Second, Player 
B’s expectation about Player A’s belief regarding x was significantly lower (τA>τB), and 
the treatment group who updated their belief upward therefore took away more. 
[Figure 1] 
[Table 1] 
In Column (2), I additionally control for τA. Following Greene (2018), this variable 
takes zero for the control group. The coefficient of xP does not change because they are 
uncorrelated. Intriguingly, the coefficient of τA is significantly positive. An increase in τA 
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by 100 BDT increases the likelihood of taking away more than 200 BDT by 10 percentage 
points. This is consistent with the prediction of guilt aversion, but not with outcome-based 
preferences, such as pure altruism and inequity aversion. Further, Columns (3) and (4) 
control for the participant characteristics and the amount of take-away in the first session. 
The point estimates are stable across columns. For robustness, in Table A4 I also estimate 
the impact on the amount taken beyond the 50–50 norms, that is, max{0, x-200}. The 
results do not differ qualitatively. 
There may be concern about the possibility of alternative interpretations. First, the 
anchoring effect can also cause conformity in this setting (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Second, the experimenter demand effect may have caused participants to behave in a 
manner consistent with the prediction of conformism and guilt aversion. Third, the 
experimental behavior may also be influenced by the order effect because the participants 
played session 1 and the dictator game before playing the second session. Therefore, α1 
and α2 in Equation (2) may capture these mixed effects. However, these alternatives 
cannot explain the difference in the coefficients between the groups. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examined whether and why people conform regarding antisocial behavior. 
Through an artifactual field experiment in rural Bangladesh, this study found evidence of 
conformism through the changes in the belief. These findings are consistent with the 
argument of broken windows theory, and also support the relevance of belief-dependent 
preferences. 
Two possible policy implications may be derived from this study. The existence 
of conformism implies that communities benefit when law enforcement authorities 
monitor minor disorders. In addition, conformism caused by changes in beliefs indicate 
that those in crime-prone communities are tempted to commit crime only when they 
believe that others anticipate high risk of crime victimization. Therefore, those who grow 
up in crime-prone areas would not necessarily commit crime in other cities where 
residents anticipate lower risks. There is consistent empirical evidence that teenagers who 
move from poor and crime-prone neighborhoods to more affluent neighborhoods are less 
likely to commit violent crimes than those who stay in poor neighborhoods (Ludwig et 
al., 2001). 
A limitation of this study is that the experimental design rules out the conformism 
through the strategic complementarity and extrinsic incentive. Therefore, the estimated 
degree of conformism is a lower bound of the conformism in the field. To draw 
conclusions regarding the behavioral mechanism of conformism, further studies are 
required. 
 
 
References 
Andreoni, J., Bernheim, D.B., 2009. Social image and the 50-50 norm: a theoretical and 
experimental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica 77, 1607–1636. 
Barmettler, F., Fehr, E., Zehnder, C., 2012. Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity 
and prosocial behavior in the laboratory. Games and Economic Behavior 75, 17–
34. 
Battigalli, P., Charness, G., Dufwenberg, M., 2013. Deception: the role of guilt. Journal 
 10   
of Economic Behavior and Organization 93, 227–232. 
Bayer, P., Hjalmarsson, R., Pozen, D, 2009. Building criminal capital behind bars: peer 
effects in juvenile corrections. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 105–147. 
Beck, A., Kerschbamer, R., Qiu, J., Sutter, M., 2013. Shaping beliefs in experimental 
markets for expert services: guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-
burning options. Game and Economic Behavior 81(1), 145–164. 
Bellemare, C., Sebald, A., Strobel, M., 2011. Measuring the willingness to pay to avoid 
guilt: estimation using equilibrium and stated belief models. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 26(3), 437–453. 
Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., Koch, A., Normann, H. 2010. Belief elicitation in 
experiments: is there a hedging problem? Experimental Economics 13, 412-438. 
Brandts, J., Charness, G., 2011. The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first 
survey of experimental comparisons. Experimental Economics 14, 375–398. 
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements 
for inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 
414-427. 
Carpenter, J.P. (2004). When in Rome: Conformity and the provision of public goods. 
The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(4), 395–408. 
Charness, G., Dufwenberg, M., 2006. Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74, 1579–
1601. 
Chen, Y., Harper, F. M., Konstan, J., & Li, S. X. (2010). Social comparisons and 
contributions to online communities: A field experiment on movielens. American 
Economic Review, 100(4), 1358-98. 
Dahl, G., DellaVigna, S., 2009. Does movie violence increase violent crime. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 124, 677–734. 
Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., Hennig–Schmidt, H., 2011. The framing of games and the 
psychology of play. Games and Economic Behavior 73, 459–478. 
Eichenberger, R., Oberholzer–Gee, F., 1998. Rational moralists: the role of fairness in 
democratic economic politics. Public Choice 94, 191–210. 
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Mollerstrom, J., Munkhammar, S., 2012. Social framing 
effects: preferences or beliefs? Games and Economic Behavior 76, 117–130. 
Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Tjøtta, S., Torsvik, G., 2010. Testing guilt aversion. 
Games and Economic Behavior 68, 95–107. 
Falk, A., Fischbacher, U., 2002. “Crime” in the lab-detecting social interaction. European 
Economic Review 46, 859–869. 
Fatas, E., Heap, S. P. H., & Arjona, D. R. (2018). Preference conformism: An experiment. 
European Economic Review, 105, 71-82. 
Fehr, E., Hoff, K., 2011. Introduction: tastes, castes and culture: the influence of society 
on preferences. Economic Journal 121, F396–F412. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., 2010. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free 
riding in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 100, 541–556. 
 11   
Funk, P., 2005. Governmental action, social norms and criminal behaviour. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 161, 522–535. 
Gächter, S., Nosenzo, D., & Sefton, M. (2013). PEER EFFECTS IN PRO‐SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL NORMS OR SOCIAL PREFERENCES?. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 11(3), 548-573.  
Gächter, S., Renner, E. 2010. The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public 
goods experiments. Experimental Economics 13, 364–377. 
Gaviria, A., & Raphael, S. (2001). School-based peer effects and juvenile behavior. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(2), 257-268. 
Glaeser, E.L., Sacerdote, B., Scheinkman, J.A., 1996. Crime and social interactions. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 507–548. 
Greene, W. H. (2018). Econometric Analysis. Pearson Education. 
Hauge, K. E. (2016). Generosity and guilt: The role of beliefs and moral standards of 
others. Journal of Economic Psychology 54, 35–43. 
Khalmetski, K. (2016). Testing guilt aversion with an exogenous shift in beliefs. Games 
and Economic Behavior 97, 110–119. 
Khalmetski, K., Ockenfels, A., & Werner, P. (2015). Surprising gifts: Theory and 
laboratory evidence. Journal of Economic Theory 159, 163–208. 
Kawagoe, T., & Narita, Y. (2014). Guilt aversion revisited: An experimental test of a new 
model. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 102, 1-9.  
Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S., Steg, L., 2008. The spreading of disorder. Science 322, 1681–
1685. 
Kelling, G.L., Wilson, J.Q., 1982. Broken windows: the police and neighborhood safety. 
The Atlantic Monthly. 
Kremer, M., & Levy, D. (2008). Peer effects and alcohol use among college students. The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3), 189-189. 
López-Pérez, R. (2008). Aversion to norm-breaking: A model. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 64(1), 237-267. 
Ludwig, J., Kling, J.R., 2007. Is crime contagious? Journal of Law and Economics 50, 
491–518. 
Ludwig, J., Duncan, G., Hirschfield, P., 2001. Urban poverty and juvenile crime: evidence 
from a randomised housing-mobility experiment. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116, 655–679. 
Lundborg, P. (2006). Having the wrong friends? Peer effects in adolescent substance use. 
Journal of health economics, 25(2), 214-233.  
Manski, C.F., 1993. Identification of endogenous social effects: the reflection problem. 
The Review of Economic Studies 60, 531–542. 
Manski, C.F., 2000. Economic analysis of social interactions. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14, 115–136. 
Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1993. Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth? 
American Economic Review 83, 409–414. 
Patacchini, E., Zenou, Y., 2008. The strength of weak ties in crime. European Economic 
 12   
Review 52, 209–236. 
Patacchini, E., Zenou, Y., 2012. Juvenile delinquency and conformism. The Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organisation 28, 1–31. 
Rasmusen, E., 1996. Stigma and self-fulfilling expectations of criminality. Journal of Law 
and Economics 39, 519–543. 
Reyniers, D., & Bhalla, R. (2013). Reluctant altruism and peer pressure in charitable 
giving. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(1), 7-15. 
Sah, R.K., 1991. Social osmosis and patterns of crime. Journal of Political Economy 99, 
1272–1295. 
Sasaki, S. (2019). Majority size and conformity behavior in charitable giving: Field 
evidence from a donation-based crowdfunding platform in Japan. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 70, 36-51. 
Schildberg–Hörisch, H., Strassmair, C., 2010. An experimental test of the deterrence 
hypothesis. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation 26, 1–13. 
Shang, J., & Croson, R. (2009). A field experiment in charitable contribution: The impact 
of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. The economic 
journal, 119(540), 1422-1439. 
Shoji, M. (2018). Incentive for risk sharing and trust formation: experimental and survey 
evidence from Bangladesh. Oxford Economic Papers, 70(4), 1062-1083. 
Shoji, M. (2020). Guilt and Prosocial Behavior: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from 
Bangladesh, Economic Development and Cultural Change, forthcoming. 
Sliwka, D., 2007. Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive 
schemes. The American Economic Review 97, 999–1012. 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., 1974. Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. 
Science 185, 1124–1231. 
Vanberg, C, 2008. Why do people keep their promises? An experimental test of two 
explanations. Econometrica 76, 1467–1480. 
Wilson, J.Q., Kelling, G.L., 2003. Broken windows: the police and neighborhood safety. 
In: McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J., Hughes, G. (Eds.). Criminological Perspectives: 
Essential Readings, Trowbridge, Wiltshire: Cromwell Press. 
Zafar, B., 2011. An experimental investigation of why individuals conform. European 
Economic Review 55, 774–798. 
Zenou, Y., 2003. The spacial aspects of crime. Journal of the European Economic 
Association 1, 459–467. 
  
 13   
 
 
Note: The X-axis is xP and the Y-axis is x. The mean and 90% confidence intervals are 
presented. 
 
Fig. 1: Experimental Result 
  
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Th
e a
mo
un
t to
 ta
ke
 aw
ay
100 200 300Control Group
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
100 200 300Treatment Group
Informed Amount Previous Participants Took Away
 14   
Table 1: Identifying Antisocial Conformism and its Channels  
Dependent Variable: 1 if take away more than 200 in session 2 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
xPC Previous participants’ amount  0.0010* 0.0010* 0.0010*** 0.0009** 
    of take-away (Control) [0.066] [0.066] [0.008] [0.040] 
xPT Previous participants’ amount  -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 
    of take-away (Treatment) [0.466] [0.386] [0.432] [0.264] 
T 1 if treatment group 0.3495* 0.0992 0.1170 0.1092 
  [0.052] [0.472] [0.412] [0.284] τA Player A’s expected amount of take-away  0.0010** 0.0010** 0.0007*    [0.026] [0.044] [0.096]  Participant characteristics No No Yes Yes 
 The amount of take-away in session 1 No No No Yes 
 F-test for xPT = xPC   (p-value is reported) 0.084 0.061 0.043 0.037 
 Clusters 12 12 12 12 
 Observations 208 208 208 208 
The coefficients of OLS are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the experiment 
room and day level. Wild bootstrap p-values proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) are in 
brackets (500 bootstrap replications, with imposing the null hypothesis). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Online Appendices 
Online Appendix A: Implementation of Experiment 
A1: Information spillover 
A potential concern in a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted for multiple days is information spillover 
within and across villages. If the participants inform those who have not yet participated about the 
experimental setting, it may affect the behavioral pattern of the latter group of participants. This study avoided 
this problem as follows. First, all the participants from each village were invited to the session on the same 
day, ruling out the possibility of within-village spillover. Second, the participants were recruited from 16 
villages in four unions (four villages from each union). I invited the participants from two villages in the same 
union per day, so that the experiments in each union finish within two days. Therefore, across-village spillover 
was unlikely, unless the participants on the first day provided those on the second day with information on the 
experiment immediately after their experiment. Finally, the survey unions are not adjacent, and therefore, it is 
not plausible to assume across-union spillover. Hence, the concern about information spillover was not 
considered to be severe. 
 
A2: Participants’ comprehension 
Since the education level of participants is low, this study adopts the following procedure to ensure that the 
participants comprehended the instructions. First, after explaining the setting of game, experimenters asked 
participants a few questions. For example, they were asked how much payoff Player A and Player B would 
receive if Player B takes away 250 BDT. These checks were conducted orally at the experiment-room level. 
Second, after the comprehension questions, the participants were given the payoff matrix of the game and 
made decisions for opponents. Third, if they still did not understand the setting, they could ask the 
experimenters for help. Although the experimenters were allowed to read the script out loud again more slowly, 
they were prohibited from providing additional information that was not included in the script or from 
suggesting a particular choice. 
The comprehension check may have been imperfect because the questions were not asked for each 
individual. However, the data suggest that poor comprehension is unlikely to be a severe problem for this 
sample. The amount of take-away in the first session was negatively correlated with the amount of transfer in 
the dictator game (rho= -0.135, p-value=0.051). Similarly, those who behaved antisocially in the take-away 
game were more likely to do so in the trust games as well. 
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Online Appendix B: Instructions of Experiment (Originally written in Bengali) 
To implement the experiment, the Bengali version of the following script was read out by Bangladeshi 
experimenters. When the participants answered questions, they could use a payoff matrix to ascertain the 
payoff from each choice. The participants filled out the answer sheets themselves, but they could ask the 
experimenters for help if they wanted to. Although the experimenters were allowed to reread the script aloud 
more slowly for such participants, they were prohibited from providing additional information that was not 
included in the script or from suggesting a particular choice. 
 
Welcome Speech 
Thank you all for coming and for your cooperation in the last survey in January. We are also grateful for your 
cooperation today. We would like to offer an opportunity to make money. Today you play some games and 
earn money depending on the score you get in the games. There are 18 participants in this room and another 
18 in the other room. The amount you receive depends on what you and the other participants do in the games. 
We want to emphasize that real money is at stake and we strongly recommend you to try to understand the 
games and play seriously as much as possible. It will take a total of 5 to 6 hours to play all games. After 
completing them, one of them will be chosen by rolling a die. You receive the money corresponding to your 
score in the selected game. Keep in mind that you receive money for only one game. The payment will be 
after completing all games. None of the other participants will know how much money you earn or what you 
do during the games. We will never tell anyone. To assure that your responses are confidential, we ask you not 
to talk about the games until all games are completed. If you follow this rule, we will give you 100 Tk each at 
the end of games as participation fee, in addition to the payoff in the games. However, if you talk to other 
participants or do not follow the rules in any other way, we will reduce the payment. If you do not wish to 
participate in the games for any reasons, you are free to leave now. Is there anybody who does not want to 
participate today? 
 
Instruction for the Take-away Game (Sessions 1) 
We are now starting the first game. This game is played by two people: Player A and Player B. Each of you is 
paired with somebody in the other room. You may be assigned to either Player A or Player B. The amount of 
money you can earn depends on what you and your paired participant will do in this game. As already 
mentioned, nobody can know who you are paired with. Also, none of the participants will get to know what 
you do in the game. 
Here are the rules of the game. When the game starts, we give 400 BDT to Player A and nothing to 
Player B. However, Player B can take away any amount from Player A. This is the payoff for you. If you are 
chosen to be Player B, you earn as much as you take away from Player A. If you are chosen to be Player A, 
you will get the remaining amount, if any. Player A can do nothing to control the amount of money he/she is 
left with. [Show the answer sheet for T1-1, T1-2] 
Questions 
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[T1-1] Suppose you are Player B. How much money will you take away from Player A? 
[T1-2] Suppose you are Player A. How much money do you think Player B will take away from you? 
Next, suppose you are Player A again. Imagine that the previous participants took away 100 BDT and 
Player B also knows this. Then, how much money do you think he/she will take away? [Show the answer 
sheet for T1-3 to T1-5] Please mark your guess on the right-hand side. Similarly, please fill out your guess 
considering that the previous participants took away 200 BDT and 300 BDT, respectively. 
Questions 
[T1-3] Suppose you are chosen to be Player A. If the previous participants took away 100 BDT and Player 
B also knows this, then how much do you think he/she will take away? 
[T1-4] If the previous participants took away 200 BDT and Player B also knows this, then how much do you 
think he/she will take away? 
[T1-5] Finally, if the previous participants took away 300 BDT and Player B also knows this, then how much 
do you think he/she will take away? 
 
Instruction for the Dictator Game 
You are Player A and have 400 BDT, but this time, Player B cannot take away money from you. Instead, you 
can give some money to him if you wish. If you give nothing, his payoff is zero. If you give 100 BDT, he gets 
100 BDT and you get 300 BDT. Keep in mind that your partner in this game should be different from the one 
in the last game.  
 
Instruction for the Take-away Game (Session 2): Control group 
We are starting the second session now. The rules are essentially the same as the first game. This time, you 
make a decision as Player B. When the game starts, we will give 400 BDT to Player A and nothing to you. 
You can take away any amount you wish from Player A. Keep in mind that your paired person in this game 
should be different from the one in the last game. 
There is only one change in the rules. We conducted the same games previously as well. This time, 
before you make a decision, we will inform you and your paired participant how much the other participants 
took away from Player A in the previous days. Please consider this information, and answer how much money 
you will take away. 
Here is the answer sheet [Show the answer sheet for T2-1]. The amounts the other participants took 
away are written on your sheet. Then, we ask you how much of the 400 BDT you will take away from Player 
A. 
Question 
[T2-1] You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took away about _______ BDT, 
and Player A paired with you also knows this. How much money will you then take away? 
 
Instruction for the Take-away Game (Session 2): Treatment group 
We are starting the second session now. The rules are essentially the same as the first game. This time, you 
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make a decision as Player B. When the game starts, we will give 400 BDT to Player A and nothing to you. 
You can take away any amount you wish from Player A. Keep in mind that your partner in this game should 
be different from the one in the last game. 
There are two changes in the rules. First, we asked everybody to guess the take-away amount of Player 
B in the last game. In this game, before you make a decision, we will inform you how much money Player A 
expected Player B to take away. Second, we also inform you how much the other participants took away from 
Player A in the previous days. Please consider this information, and answer how much money you will take 
away. 
Here is the answer sheet [Show the answer sheet for T2-2]. The amounts Player A anticipated and the 
amounts the other participants in the previous days took away are written on your sheet. Then, we ask you 
how much of the 400 BDT you will take away from Player A. 
Question 
[T2-2] You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took away about _______ BDT, 
and Player A paired with you also knows this. Additionally, Player A anticipates that you will take away 
______ BDT. How much money will you then take away? 
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Answer Sheet for Take Away (1) 
Room_____  HH ID (2 digits)_____________  Village _______________ 
Day _______ Month______  
 
[1] Suppose you are Player B. How much money will you take away from 
Player A?  
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
 
[2] Suppose you are Player A. How much money do you think Player B 
will take away from you?  
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
 
[3] Suppose you are chosen to be Player A. If the previous participants 
took away BDT 100 and Player B also knows this, then how much do you 
think he/she will take away? 
[4] If the previous participants took away BDT 200 and Player B also 
knows this, then how much do you think he/she will take away? 
[5] Finally, if the previous participants took away BDT 300 and Player B 
also knows this, then how much do you think he/she will take away? 
The amount the 
others took away 
Your guess about your Player B  
100 Tk 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
200 Tk 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
300 Tk 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
 
[6] Suppose you are Player A.  Suppose also that Player B cannot take 
away your money this time.  However, you can give him some money, 
if you wish.  Then, how much BDT will you give to him? 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
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Payoff Matrix for Take Away (1) (2) 
 
The amount Player B takes away 
(The amount Player A gives away) 
Player A’s payoff Player B’s payoff 
0 400 0 
50 350 50 
100 300 100 
150 250 150 
200 200 200 
250 150 250 
300 100 300 
350 50 350 
400 0 400 
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Answer Sheet for Take Away (2) Control Group 
Room_____  HH ID (2 digits)_____________  Village _______________ 
Day _______ Month______  
 
Question 
You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took 
away about BDT _______, and Player A paired with you also knows 
this. How much money will you then take away?   
 
Your decision 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
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Answer Sheet for Take Away (2) Treatment Group 
Room_____  HH ID (2 digits)_____________  Village _______________ 
Day _______ Month______  
 
Question 
You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took 
away about BDT _______, and Player A paired with you also knows this. 
Additionally, Player A anticipates that you will take away BDT ______. 
How much money will you then take away?  
 
Your decision 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 
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Table A1: Overview of Experiments and Tasks in Each Game 
Tasks 
Take away game (Session 1) 
1. Player B: Only the opponent participant receives 400 BDT from the experimenter. Decide the amount 
to take away from him/her. 
2. Player A: Receive 400 BDT from the experimenter. Guess the amount that the opponent will take 
away from the participant. 
 
Dictator game 
Receive 400 BDT from the experimenter. Decide the amount to transfer to the opponent. 
 
Take away game (Session 2) 
Player B (Control): Only the opponent participant receives 400 BDT from the experimenter. Decide the 
amount to take away from him/her after being informed about how much previous participants took away. 
Player B (Treatment): Only the opponent participant receives 400 BDT from the experimenter. Decide 
the amount to take away from him/her after being informed about how much previous participants took 
away and how much the opponent expects the participant to take away. 
 
Trust game with hidden action  
 
Risk preference game 
 
Trust game with complete information 
All the participants played all the games, and in each game, they played all the roles. The results of only take 
away games are used in this study. 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics (N=208) 
Variables Mean S.D. 
Experiment data   
The amount to take away in session 1 255.53 131.07 
1 if take away more than 200 in session 1 0.56 0.50 
Expected amount to be taken away in session 1 251.44 115.67 
The amount to take away in session 2 212.74 109.32 
1 if take away more than 200 in session 2 0.39 0.49 
Participant characteristics   
1 if participant is household head 0.51 0.50 
1 if participant is male 0.68 0.47 
Age of participant 35.44 13.89 
Schooling years of participant 6.04 4.01 
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Table A3: Balance Test (N=208) 
Dependent variables xPT xPC T Constant 
The amount to take away -0.012 [0.886] 0.048 [0.698] 58.99 [0.340] 215.0*** [0.000] 
1 if take away more than 200 -0.001 [0.170] 0.0001 [0.926] 0.20 [0.328] 0.49 [0.172] 
Expected amount of take-away 0.110 [0.410] 0.005 [0.926] 16.87 [0.588] 225.8*** [0.000] 
Household head -0.0003 [0.482] -0.0001 [0.826] -0.05 [0.824] 0.60*** [0.000] 
Male  0.0004 [0.510] 0.0001 [0.862] -0.08 [0.636] 0.68*** [0.000] 
Age  -0.008 [0.666] -0.012 [0.974] -5.89 [0.248] 41.14*** [0.000] 
Schooling years 0.003 [0.550] 0.001 [0.818] 0.33 [0.904] 5.37*** [0.000] 
The coefficients of OLS are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the experiment room and day level. 
Wild bootstrap p-values proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) are in brackets (500 bootstrap replications, with 
imposing the null hypothesis). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table A4: Identifying Antisocial Conformism and its Channels  
Dependent Variable: The amount taken beyond the 50-50 norms in Session 2 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
xPC Previous participants’ amount  0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0044*** 0.0048*** 
    of take-away (Control) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
xPT Previous participants’ amount  -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0019 
    of take-away (Treatment) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
T 1 if treatment group 1.0458*** 0.4631 0.5716 0.7577** 
  (0.352) (0.395) (0.423) (0.371) τA Player A’s expected amount of take-away  0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0015    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  Participant characteristics No No Yes Yes 
 The amount of take-away in session 1 No No No Yes 
 F-test for xPT = xPC   (p-value is reported) 0.0014 0.0012 0.0002 0.0001 
 Clusters 12 12 12 12 
 Observations 208 208 208 208 
The coefficients of ordered probit are reported. Clustered standard errors at the experiment room and day 
level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
